

100-44-

20 October 1951

To: SAC, Karlsruhe
Attn: SAC

From: Chief, FBI

Subject: Approval of Developmental Project GAMBRO

References: 100-9120, paras 1 and 2; 100-2131, paras 3 and 4.

1. Project GAMBRO is approved as a developmental project for the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951. The following amounts are allocated to cover expenses during the period and are to be charged to GAMBRO:

Salary 1,750 M. West

Operating expenses 3,000 M. West

2. Retroactive approval is granted for payments made to the agent during the period 16 March 1951 to 30 June 1951, amounting to 550 M. West and 1,000 M. East. These funds will be charged to GAMBRO.

3. A check of available order of battle data on the Wehrmacht indicates that the military record supplied by GAMBRO in his Lebenslauf is correct with regard to all major units. In only a few instances, however, has it been possible to check accurately the existence, location and movement of non-divisional units, especially during the final months of the war.

4. GAMBRO's accounts of his activities from November 1945 to March 1951 are full of contradictions, improbabilities, and implausible statements. In addition the information he has furnished us since the operation began has received a very low evaluation from [] (100-32304). Add to this the fact that GAMBRO evaluated his story as pure fabrication after catching him in the act (100-11077), and the operation becomes most suspect. Let us again emphasize the necessity for thorough interrogation of GAMBRO including the use of SERVICOS. [] []

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3. We are attaching an analysis of the MORA case by ☐ ☐
changed to MORA-9131
There are additional inconsistencies: The list of objects where he worked
is different in the document from what he told ☒ SCIC, inconsistencies
in dates - became safety inspector (November 1942 or 11 April 1943, etc.
Such things can of course be blamed on a failing memory, but the latter is
not an especially good qualification for an agent.

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of a miner in order to coerce him into becoming an 'informant'. If the ~~the~~ Russians really did display such an enormous interest in Cambio, would they not have used more of a physical 'persuasion' to convince him to work for them?

b. What type of informing had the Russians intended Cambio to do? Just report on his fellow miners or does it seem apparent that he was to ~~become a full-fledged agent~~ become a full-fledged agent. It is hard to believe that Cambio would have ^{of} more value to them as an informant than as a safety ~~or~~ and head engineer, since, according to my knowledge there is rather a shortage of experienced top-notch mining engineers in the uranium works. And, no doubt, Cambio appears to be a well versed mining engineer, who not only possesses ~~amp's~~ experience but also, according to his Lebenslauf, had quite an academic background in mining.

re par. 2. a. It would be interesting to know exactly ~~what~~ were the circumstances which led to the arrest of OSTERMANN in August 1949. Why was Ostermann allegedly ~~undertaking~~ undertaking all these risky subversive ~~activities~~ activities? Was it by order of the LDP or did he do so on his own ~~initiative~~ out of ideological motivation? Printing illegal pamphlets for the LDP is one thing, but sabotage is quite another matter. I presume that when Ostermann was arrested it was for the publication of clandestine literature and not for his alleged participation in blowing up the six mine shafts.

b. Does Cambio have any idea as to ~~who~~ who tipped off the Russians that he was involved in illegal activities? It is hard to believe that the Russians ~~could~~ ^{could} extract a complete confession from Ostermann. Yet, we have received no

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GAMBO: This is not at the weirdest case I have seen. Right at the beginning I would like mention that once again it appears quite apparent that either we should obtain much more detailed information and background on this case from ~~the~~ CIC, or CIC has worked on this case in a horrible fashion. I shall attempt to ask questions taking each paragraph of NSA-A-9131 individually. Furthermore I shall try to put my thoughts on this case on paper.

re par.1: a. It does not seem plausible that the NSA will cut off the salary

communication from the field to the effect that Cambio 8 ~~XXXX~~ and Cambio 18 have been arrested, both of them having participated in the alleged sabotage of the six mines. Was there any article in the newspapers available to BOB describing these explosions?

c. It is inconceivable that Cambio, a man accused of sabotage and sentenced to 25 years' hard labor, would start his ~~XXXX~~ sentence in a 'private residence', and if this private residence happened to be Camp Marenka, it is even more inconceivable that the latter installation would not be under heavy guard. Just as incredible is the idea that a man ready to go to jail is allowed to exchange his ~~XXXX~~ into ~~XXXX~~ money, and, furthermore, is not searched and is able to keep the rest of the money in his money belt. Is there anywhere in the history of the Russian occupation of Germany a precedent making ^{plausible} such a gentlemanly conduct toward a prisoner sentenced to 25 years' hard labor ~~plausible~~?

re par.3. Cambio's pride in relating that the explosion in pit #57 in Johannegeorgenstadt, ~~which~~ ^{which} killed 56 miners all of whom were 500% SED Aktivisten / is quite understandable but reminds me very much of the HERSULES case, especially since he read about it in ~~the XXXX~~ ^{the} German newspaper before narrating his exploits.

re par.34. a. Is there any way we can find out to what extent the British ^V ~~SS~~ (?) in Eltoho debriefed him and what and how much information he divulged to them? If he related to them the same story he gave us, it seems strange that the British did not find appropriate use for him; or ~~by exchange~~ did they immediately classify him as an agent provocateur? ² ~~1~~ states that after his expected job in Aachen did not materialize he left for the Eastern Zone "to renew his acquaintances". This seems to be quite a daring ^{feat}

to undertake just to visit friends, especially when he knew that if caught it would mean 25 years and more at hard labor.

b. According to [] Gambio worked as a lumberman in the British Zone, however, CIC reports that he was working as a farm-laborer. CIC reports that he went to the East Zone because he was bored being a farm-laborer; [] on the other hand, wrote that he left after the promised job with an Aschem engineering firm fell through.

c. Is Togostrasse 47 the address in Berlin where he found his wife and children on 29 August 1950? In this connection it seems rather strange that the wife of a saboteur who escaped from the Russians is left unmolested and remains free to go come and go as she pleases.

re par.6. The story of the Geiger counter and Electroscope does not sound very convincing.: a) why did he steal these instruments?

b) from where did he take them

c) When was the theft detected; and if so, was an investigation of the theft conducted at Wismut?

d) Why and whom in Eastertal did he leave the instruments?

Re par.7. Under what circumstances did he lose his job with BEWAG in Berlin/
Hankel Moabit? According to his own statements, Gambio went back to the East-Zone in January and remained until 16 March. This seems to be a rather lengthy time to spend in "enemy" territory of his own volition. Exactly why did he go back to the East Zone this time? Had he intended to gather information and then try to peddle it to some American intelligence organization? Would it be possible for [] to obtain a detailed account of his long stay in the Sovzone, preferably day by day and if possible accounting for every hour?

This case seems to be ~~XXXXXX~~ composed mostly of questions and queries on our side, but aside from not sounding very plausible there are too many discrepancies between ~~XXXXXX~~ his Lebenslauf & ~~E~~ account and the CIS report. However, a more worthwhile opinion can be formed as soon as we are in possession of the ECIC interrogation report.

Indications as they stand right now point directly to a provocation because it is very hard to believe that Cambio can successfully haunt his old stopping grounds for ~~XXXXXX~~ at a time without being noticed by a Russian or ~~the~~ Russian informant. Naturally at this point it is very hard to make a categorical statement, but once some of the above questions are answered and we have read the ECIC report a more definite statement can be made and a specific course of action can be advocated.

Positive - that
in a way, it is possible
Convincing - it is possible
Possible - it is possible